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11 Introduction
Our goal is to begin to reconcile the notions of increasing returns and perfect
competition. We demonstrate in our model that equilibria can exist and can
be eﬃcient without government intervention. This ﬁnding is established for a
rather speciﬁc model with parameter restrictions. Land plays a key role in our
analysis. In this context, models of imperfect competition have been analyzed
and are known to produce market failures. It is not known, however, if such
failures are due to product diﬀerentiation or to the departure from price taking
b e h a v i o r .W ea d d r e s st h i si s s u eb ya s s u m i n gt h a ta g e n t st a k ep r i c e sa sg i v e n .
It is well-known that global increasing returns (say a ﬁx e dc o s tf o l l o w e db y
constant returns to scale production) and perfect competition are not compat-
ible, since at an equilibrium, the ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt maximization
– price equals marginal cost – implies negative proﬁts. Although substantial
progress has been made using models in which price is set at marginal cost but
ﬁrms are subsidized, or multipart tariﬀs are employed, problems still remain;
see Bonnisseau and Cornet [14] [as well as other papers in the symposium
issue], Bonanno [13] or Vassilakis [45], [46] for discussion.1
Our initial goal was to prove a second welfare theorem. Here transfers
have generally been employed in the literature. They can obviously mitigate
the problem of negative proﬁts for producers by simply providing a subsidy to
producers who are operating at a Pareto optimum but who would otherwise
make a loss at supporting prices. The idea that ﬁrms yielding increasing
returns to scale should be subsidized in order to obtain an eﬃcient allocation
goes back at least to Marshall [29, Book V, Chapter XIII], the ﬁrst edition
of which was published in 1890. A precursor can be found in Whitaker [47,
pp. 88-89, pp. 228-230], who published writings of Marshall dating from the
1870’s. Pigou [35, Part II, Chapter XI], ﬁrst published in 1920, touches on this
subject in passing. Pigou [33, p. 197] is particularly explicit:2
In order to maximize satisfaction –inequalities of wealth among
1For instance, marginal cost pricing relates only to the ﬁrst order conditions for optimiza-
tion for the ﬁrms, so at a marginal cost pricing equilibrium, a ﬁrm may not be maximizing
proﬁts. Further, a marginal cost pricing or multipart tariﬀ equilibrium allocation is not nec-
essarily Pareto optimal. (Marginal cost pricing reﬂects the ﬁrst order conditions for Pareto
eﬃciency, but the second order conditions might not hold.)
2Pigou [33] is part of a far-ranging discussion about “Empty Boxes” in the Economic
Journal addressing this topic; see in particular Robertson [37, p. 22]. Others involved in
this discussion are Clapham [15], Pigou [32], Sraﬀa [42], Shove [40], Pigou [34], Robbins [36],
Schumpeter [39], Young [48], Robertson [38], Sraﬀa [43], and Shove [41].
2diﬀerent people and so on being ignored – it is necessary, except
in the special case where satisfaction is maximised by a nil output,
for that quantity of output to be produced which makes demand
price equal to marginal costs, i.e. which corresponds to the point of
intersection of the demand curve and the curve of marginal costs.
[...] Output, however, tends to be carried to the point in respect of
which the demand curve intersects with the supply curve. [...] But
in conditions of decreasing costs, where the supply curve coincides
w i t ht h ec u r v eo fa v e r a g ec o s t s ,i tw i l ln o tb et h er i g h tp o i n t .U n -
less the State intervenes by a bounty or in some other way, output
will be carried less far than it is socially desirable that it should
be carried.
It is important to note that the work of Marshall and Pigou confused scale
economies with externalities internal to an industry but external to each ﬁrm,
and consequently they recommended a misplaced Pigouvian remedy for scale
economies. Our reconciliation of increasing returns and perfect competition is
direct and invokes no externality argument.
The use of transfers would be an easy way out of the conﬂict between
increasing returns and a perfectly competitive equilibrium by essentially as-
suming the conﬂict away. Instead, we focus on existence of a competitive
equilibrium and the ﬁrst welfare theorem.
This research has applications to the theory of agglomeration and city
formation. Increasing returns is often used as an agglomerative force in models
seeking to explain how, where, and why cities form. For example, Fujita
[19]; Fujita and Krugman [21], [22]; and Krugman [26], [27], [28]; which were
preceded by Abdel-Rahman [1], [2] and Abdel-Rahman and Fujita [3], use a
Dixit-Stiglitz [17] framework and increasing returns to generate city formation
in a monopolistic competition context. Since our model will employ increasing
returns in a spatial context, it oﬀers the prospect of addressing questions and
generating testable hypotheses about cities. This is discussed further in the
conclusion.
In what follows, we stick as closely as possible to the perfectly competitive
ideal, since it is simplest to analyze, it is a very standard and convenient bench-
mark, it allows us to develop proofs of existence of equilibrium (perhaps useful
in the imperfect competition context) without having to worry about other dis-
tractions, it may be a good approximation to reality in large economies, and
it will tell us when the welfare theorems are likely to hold and why. More-
3over, it enables us to separate problems due to the spatial context from those
attributable to imperfect competition. Notice that models of marginal cost
pricing, multipart tariﬀs, and subsidization of ﬁrms under increasing returns
all employ close relatives of perfect competition.
We investigate whether a government ought to intervene in markets for
commodities subject to increasing returns in production. The key to the anal-
ysis is provided by Berliant and Fujita [9], who show that for Alonso’s urban
economic model, a model of pure exchange on the real line where agents are
required to own intervals that represent land parcels, there is generally a con-
tinuum of equilibria under perfect competition.3 Infra-marginal land (that is,
land not at the endpoints of an interval owned by an agent) is not priced
uniquely, thus allowing a kind of indeterminacy in the expenditure of agents
on land. It is this kind of indeterminacy that we exploit below to eﬀect implicit
transfers to producers (by keeping the infra-marginal price of land low) who
would otherwise have negative proﬁts.
Section 2 presents the notation and model while section 3 introduces an
example with one producer and one consumer, solving for two diﬀerent types
of equilibria. Section 4 shows how these equilibria can be extended to a model
with two producers and multiple consumers, section 5 presents a version of the
ﬁrst welfare theorem, while section 6 concludes. An appendix contains all of
the proofs.
3A spatial model with ﬁnite numbers of producers and consumers (rather than a con-
tinuum) is examined because in the arguments we use, agents employ intervals rather than
densities of land. By this, we mean that agents own land parcels represented by sets of
positive Lebesgue measure in a Euclidean space (R) rather than owning parcels represented
by a quantity at a point. The latter is more common in urban economics, and is usually
called a density. Berliant [7] shows that the usual approximation of continuum economies
by ﬁnite economies does not work when land plays a role in the models, so demand and
equilibria of the continuum models may not be close to those of any interesting ﬁnite model.
It is then reasonable to ask if the continuum models make any sense. Examples in Berliant
and ten Raa [11] show that equilibrium can fail to exist in the monocentric city model under
standard assumptions on preferences. Examples in Berliant, Papageorgiou and Wang [10]
show that the welfare theorems can fail in the monocentric city model. Berliant and Wang
[12] show that even utilitarian social optima might fail to exist in continuum models with
land. The implication of these examples is that the use of a continuum of consumers solves
some of the problems associated with the indivisibility of location, but creates others.
42T h e M o d e l
We introduce production into Alonso’s [4] model of pure exchange. The model
of pure exchange was developed further by Asami [5], Asami, Fujita and Smith
[6], Berliant [8], and Berliant and Fujita [9].
Consider a long narrow city represented on the real line. Land is given by
X =[ 0 ,l),w h e r el is the length of the city. In section 4, it will be convenient
to use another interval of the real line for X to reduce computations. The
density of land available is 1 at each point x ∈ X.
There are i =1 ,...,Iconsumers and j =1 ,...,J producers. Each consumer
has an endowment of 1 unit of labor, which will be supplied inelastically.
For simplicity, labor is assumed to be homogeneous, so labor income is the
same for all consumers. Moreover, consumers all have the same preferences,
and will get utility from a composite consumption good and land. Thus,
u : R2
+ → R. Consumers are not endowed with composite good or land.
Composite good is produced, while an absentee landlord is endowed with land.
We write u(c,s),w h e r ec is the quantity of consumption good and s is the
quantity of land consumed; the latter is equal to the length of the interval
owned by the consumer. For consumer i, ci is composite good consumption,
si is land consumption, w i st h ew a g er a t e ,a n d[ai,a i + si) ⊆ X is the parcel
of land owned by i.
Notice that w is assumed to be independent of the location of labor. This
is an assumption of perfect competition, that each agent takes prices as given
independent of their own actions and the actions of other agents, particularly
ﬁrms’ locations. Without such an assumption, equilibrium allocations are not
likely to be Pareto optimal. Since our purpose is to reconcile increasing returns
with perfect competition, we must take prices as parametric. Of course, for
other purposes, imperfect competition is a more suitable premise. If wages are
allowed to vary with location in the context of perfect competition, then the
constant wage gradient equilibrium that we study here naturally becomes a
special case.4 Consumers have no intrinsic preference for location.
4The decision whether or not to use a wage gradient is not at all obvious. Our model
is not one of multiple regions, but rather of one city, since we have commuting cost but no
transport cost. From a positive viewpoint, one does not observe in the real world wages
paid to workers diﬀering by their location of residence within a city or by producer location
within a city. From a normative viewpoint, if we had wages diﬀering by producer, our
equilibrium allocations would likely not be eﬃcient, since symmetry of the allocation would
be destroyed. In the literature, for example Fujita and Ogawa [23] use a wage gradient that
diﬀers by location of a ﬁrm (but not by location of consumer residence). Subject to the
5Composite consumption good, assumed to be freely mobile, is taken to be
numeraire. The price of land is denoted by an integrable function p : X → R.
The price of consumer i’s parcel is
R ai+si
ai p(x)dm(x). Throughout, m is the
Lebesgue measure on the real line.
Since the labor market is competitive and consumers pay their own com-
muting cost, consumers will turn to the producers who minimize their com-
muting cost. Let producer j use land parcel [bj,b j +σj) ⊆ X.D e ﬁne t>0 to
be the constant marginal monetary cost (in terms of composite consumption
good) of commuting an extra mile. Then the cost of commuting to producer j
is given by T
j
i (ai,s i,b j,σj)=t·inf{kx−yk| x ∈ [ai,a i +si), y ∈ [bj,b j +σj)},
the closest point distance between consumer i and employer j.W h e n c o n -
sumers optimize utility subject to their budget constraints, they will choose to
commute to the closest producer. However, we must account for the possibility
t h a tt h e r ei sm o r et h a no n ec l o s e s tp r o d u c e r .
This is the form of commuting cost used by Alonso [4] and Berliant and
Fujita [9]; it incorporates a constant marginal cost of transport per unit dis-
tance to the closest ﬁrm. Notice that commuting cost depends on both the
consumer location and the location of the nearest employer.




i (ai,s i,b j,σj).
For notational simplicity, deﬁne B =[ b1,σ1,b 2,σ2,...,b J,σJ],a n dd e ﬁne
Ti(ai,s i,B)=[ T
1
i (ai,s i,b 1,σ1),...,T
J
i (ai,s i,b J,σJ)].
T h ef a c tt h a tT
j
i can depend on the allocation of land to producer j creates an
externality, in that the choice of land parcel by an agent (in particular, a pro-
ducer) can aﬀect the budget constraint of another (in particular, a consumer).
What is fascinating about this observation is that, as we shall see in section 5,
this externality might not create a market failure.
Let Qi be a J-dimensional unit vector (one component 1 and all others 0),
to indicate consumer i’s choice of employer. Let S be the collection of all such
unit vectors, and let Q
j
i denote component j of Qi.
remarks above, such a structure would be admissible in our framework, but would make the
analysis much messier. In general, addition of a wage gradient to a model will not add extra
degrees of freedom to equilibrium determination. Although more free variables are added
to the system in the form of wages depending on locations, extra market clearing conditions
equating labor demand to supply at each location are also added.
6Consumer i’s optimization problem is5
max
ai,si,ci,Qi
u(ci,s i) subject to ci +
Z ai+si
ai
p(x)dm(x)+Qi · Ti(ai,s i,B)=w (1)
This framework allows consumers to choose to work at a ﬁrm so that com-
muting cost and commuting distance are minimized.6
Producers use land and labor to produce composite good. All producers
have the same production function g : R2
+ → R. Let producer j use land
parcel [bj,b j + σj) ⊆ X. The scalar qj ∈ R+ represents the labor demand of
ﬁrm j.W ed e ﬁne output of ﬁrm j to be zj = g(σj,q j). We assume throughout
most of the sequel that g(σ,q)=β · min(σ,q) − f for σ > 0 and q>0,w h e r e
f is a ﬁx e dc o s ti nt e r m so fc o m p o s i t eg o o d . W ed e ﬁne g(0,0) = 0,s oi ti s
possible for a ﬁrm to shut down. This has the implication that in equilibrium,
proﬁts must be non-negative. The only part of this paper where we alter this
production function is at the beginning of section 6, where it is convenient to
normalize the labor input for computational purposes. The proﬁt optimization
problem of ﬁrm j is:





p(x)dm(x) − qjw.( 2 )
List the ﬁrms’ proﬁts in the vector π ≡ [π1,...,πJ].
We have assumed, implicitly, that only the size of an interval matters in
production. Thus, output is a function of land and labor where both inputs
are represented by scalars and, therefore, returns to scale can be deﬁned as
usual. It is the ﬁxed cost f that gives us increasing returns to scale. The
particular form of the production function that we use implies that average
cost is globally decreasing, so increasing returns are in fact global.
5Unlike most of the literature in urban economics, we do not introduce or use the concept
of “bid rent,” since we have no need for it. The results and proofs are more easily given
in primal rather than dual form. Any references to “marginal willingness to pay” for
land are simply to the marginal rates of substitution at a particular bundle of commodities.
Notice that agents take into account the total supply of land when solving their optimization
problems. This constriction of the commodity space is essential to our results, and appears
in the spatial economic literature more generally. It is hard to imagine that a consumer
visualizes simultaneously purchasing two diﬀerent houses on the same parcel or buying a
house in a lake when solving her optimization problem.
6Strictly speaking, a consumer could choose not to work, but then good consumption
would be zero and utility would be suboptimal in all theorems of this paper. Hence we
ignore the possibility Qi =0 . Also notice that utility levels will be equal across consumers
in equilibrium.
7Following Alonso [4] and the new urban economics literature, an absentee
landlord is endowed with all of the land, but gets utility only from composite
good. For simplicity, we also endow the absentee landlord with all of the shares
in all of the ﬁrms.7 In equilibrium, the absentee landlord collects all of the land





The composite good consumption of the landlord will be denoted by cL.
Notice that, as in the Alonso model, preferences and production are location
independent.
We continue with the analogs of standard deﬁnitions for this model.
Deﬁnition 1 An allocation is a list [(ci,a i,s i,Q i)I
i=1,c L,(zj,b j,σj,q j)J
j=1],
where for every i =1 ,...,Iand j =1 ,...,J, ci,z j,c L,q j ∈ R+, si,a i,b j,σj ∈ X,
and Qi ∈ S.
Deﬁnition 2 An allocation [(ci,a i,s i,Q i)I
i=1,c L,(zj,b j,σj,q j)J













i = qj for j =1 ,...,J (5)
([ai,a i + si))
I
i=1,([bj,b j + σj))
J
j=1 form a partition of X. (6)
Deﬁnition 3 A feasible allocation [(ci,a i,s i,Q i)I
i=1,c L,(zj,b j,σj,q j)J
j=1] is called












j=1] with all z0
j > 0 such that
c0
L ≥ cL and for each i =1 ,...,I, u(c0
i,s 0
i) ≥ u(ci,s i), with a strict inequality
holding for at least one of these relations.
It is important to note that this concept of eﬃciency does not allow entry
or exit of ﬁrms.
7It seems clear that one could allow consumer ownership of stock in the ﬁrms without
altering the results much, but at the cost of complicating the arguments and notation.
8Condition (5) requires that all people work. Strictly speaking, this is not necessary.
However, since we will assume that there is no disutility of work and utility is increasing
in consumption, (5) will hold in equilibrium. Also, condition (6) requires that all land is
used. This will hold in equilibrium since we will assume that utility is increasing in land
consumption.
8Deﬁnition 4 A competitive equilibrium consists of a feasible allocation
[(ci,a i,s i,Q i)I
i=1,c L,(zj,b j,σj,q j)J
j=1], an integrable land price function p : X →
R, a vector of proﬁts π ∈ RJ and a wage w ∈ R (the freely mobile composite








(ci,a i,s i,Q i) solves (1) for i =1 ,...,I (8)
(πj,z j,b j,σj,q j) solves (2) for j =1 ,...,J. (9)
The allocation component of a competitive equilibrium is called an equilib-
rium allocation.
This equilibrium concept does allow ﬁrms to shut down, but does not allow
entry beyond J ﬁrms.9 In equilibrium, ﬁrm proﬁts are non-negative (and
possibly positive).
3 Existence of Equilibrium with One Producer
and One Consumer
Due to the discreteness and nonconvexities inherent in the model,10 we prove
that an equilibrium exists by actually ﬁnding some.
In this section we examine the following set of examples. Let I =1and
J =1 , and for notational simplicity, drop the subscripts referring to agents.
We will ﬁnd particular equilibria (others exist as well) with two types of rent
densities: continuous and discontinuous.
Deﬁnition 5 We say that the functional form restriction holds when util-
ity satisﬁes the following condition: u(c,s)=c + α · ln(s)(α > 0).
Next, let us give bounds on exogenous parameters for continuous equilib-
rium rent densities.
9Debreu (1959) has a similar feature, but there it is less innocent, for he assumes non-
increasing returns to scale, which favors small-scale production and unlimited entry. Our
inclusion of a ﬁx e dc o s tp u t sab o u n do nt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms.
10As described in Berliant and Fujita [9], demand (and in the present model, supply)
correspondences are not convex-valued. In fact, the contract curve in the pure exchange
model is disconnected; see ﬁgure 2 of that paper.
9Deﬁnition 6 We say that the parameter restrictions for continuous
equilibrium rent densities hold when the following conditions are met: l ≥
2.87, 0 <f<φc(α,l), β ≥ Bc(α,l), t ≥ τc(α,l), where the functions φc, Bc,
and τc all mapping R2 into R are deﬁned in the appendix.
In essence, what is needed is that total land l ≥ 2.87, ﬁxed cost f is small
relative to the marginal utility of land (α), the marginal product (β) is large
relative to α,a n dc o m m u t i n gc o s t(t) is large relative to α. Clearly, these
restrictions represent a set of parameters with nonempty interior.
The ﬁxed cost must be small here to guarantee that the producer can be
subsidized on its parcel so that the ﬁxed cost is covered but the consumer will
not encroach. If the ﬁxed cost is high, then a low price of land on the producer
parcel covering the ﬁxed cost will induce the consumer to encroach.
Theorem 1 Under the functional form restriction and the parameter restric-
tions for continuous equilibrium rent densities, there exists an equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix.
Figure 1 provides a picture of the equilibrium. The horizontal axis rep-
resents the location space, while the vertical axis is used for the land price
density (in dollars per foot or inch). The horizontal axis is located not at
height zero, but at height α/(l − 1), the equilibrium marginal utility of land
for the consumer. The ﬁrm is located on the parcel [0,1) while the consumer
buys the remainder of the land. The shaded area is the implicit subsidy from
the landlord to the producer, in dollars. The price density is in fact the min-
imum of two curves representing marginal willingness to pay for land of the
consumer over (0,l−1) and (1,l) (starting from the consumer’s right and left
endpoints, respectively).
Heuristically, this is an equilibrium for the following reasons. Regarding
the consumer, the ﬁr s to r d e rc o n d i t i o n sf o rp r o b l e m( 1 )t e l lu st h a tt h ep r i c eo f
the marginal piece of land purchased on the end farthest from the ﬁrm must be
equal to the marginal willingness to pay for land, or p(a + s)=α/s,a n dt h a t
the price of marginal piece of land purchased closest to the ﬁrm, p(a),m u s t
be between the marginal willingness to pay for land generally, α/s,a n dt h e
marginal willingness to pay for additional land plus the associated reduction
in commuting cost, α/s + t, from having the front of the parcel closer to the
ﬁrm. The latter condition arises because marginal commuting cost drops
discontinuously from t to 0 as the consumer becomes adjacent to the ﬁrm.
With our quasi-linear utility function, these ﬁrst order conditions are satisﬁed
10by the parcel [1,l). N o t i c et h a ti ft isn’t large enough, then this last condition
m i g h tn o th o l d ;t h a ti sw h yt h e r ei sap a r a m e t e rr e s t r i c t i o no nt.R e g a r d i n g
the ﬁrm, proﬁts are location independent, so the ﬁrm simply wants to buy a
parcel that is cheapest per unit of land purchased. Given the price density,
either the left endpoint is at 0 or the right endpoint is at 1. Optimization over
the amount of land used by the ﬁrm yields a price equals marginal revenue
product condition. Given an equilibrated wage, this will occur when the ﬁrm
uses either [0,1) or [l − 1,l). Symmetry of the price density around l/2 is
important for showing that the consumer and ﬁrm wouldn’t want to inhabit
the same parcel.
Land payments follow the p contour, but land use by agents is adjusted in
response to the marginal price paid for an extra unit of land. While the ﬁrm
would incur a loss if it had to pay this marginal price for each unit of land
it uses, lower inframarginal prices in [0,1) can generate zero proﬁt.11 Notice
that if ﬁxed cost f is too large, the implicit subsidy cannot cover it. That is
why there is a parameter restriction on f.
Next we shall study another class of equilibria for this same model, one that
is motivated by the observation that marginal commuting cost is discontinuous
when the consumer and producer are adjacent. Marginal commuting cost
drops from t to zero when the consumer and producer touch, thus allowing a
discontinuity in land rent at the boundary.
Deﬁnition 7 We say that the parameter restrictions for discontinuous
equilibrium rent densities hold when the following conditions are met: l ≥
3.19, 0 <f≤ φd(α,l), β ≥ Bd(α,l), t ≥ τd(α,l), where the functions φd, Bd,
and τd all mapping R2 into R are deﬁned in the appendix.
Once again, total land (l) needs to be large enough, while ﬁxed cost (f)
must be small relative to the marginal utility of land (α), the marginal product
(β) must be large relative to α,a n dc o m m u t i n gc o s t(t) must also be large
relative to α. Again, these restrictions represent a set of parameters with
nonempty interior.
Theorem 2 Under the functional form restrictions and the parameter restric-
tions for discontinuous equilibrium rent densities, there exists an equilibrium.
11The same kind of subsidy could apply to consumers, but it is not relevant for them.
There is no analog of the non-negative proﬁt condition for consumers, whereas this is a
participation constraint for producers in our model.
11Proof: See Appendix.
Figure 2 provides a picture of the equilibrium. The horizontal axis repre-
sents the location space, while the vertical axis is used for the land price density
(in dollars per foot). The horizontal axis is located not at height zero, but at
height α/(l − 1), the equilibrium marginal utility of land for the consumer.
The ﬁrm is located on the parcel [0,1) while the consumer buys the remainder
of the land. The shaded area is the implicit subsidy from the landlord to the
producer, in dollars.
The intuition for why ﬁgure 2 represents an equilibrium is very much the
same as the intuition for why ﬁgure 1 represents an equilibrium. The discon-
tinuity in rent is admissible for the following reasons. From the viewpoint of
the consumer, it doesn’t induce further purchase of land, since at 1 (and to
t h el e f to f1), price is just equal to marginal willingness to pay, α/(l −1),a n d
the marginal reduction in commuting cost from moving left of 1 is nil. From
the viewpoint of the ﬁrm, expansion of its parcel to the right of 1 means less
proﬁt, since the marginal revenue product of land is equal to its price at 1.
4 Existence of Equilibrium with Two Produc-
ers and Many Consumers
This generalization of the model is not as easy as it may appear. In this
section, ﬁrst we will examine the natural extension of the model to multiple
producers and explain what goes wrong with existence of equilibrium. Then
we will make a modiﬁcation so as to obtain existence of equilibrium.
Consider a model with one producer and an even number, say 2I,o fc o n -
sumers. Let us examine a continuous rent density equilibrium. To keep the
model as close as possible to the one in the last section, let us change the
technology to g(σ,q)=β·min(σ,q/I)−f,a n dl e tX =[ −l+1,l].O n ew a yt o
construct a continuous rent density is illustrated in Figure 3. In the end, this
ﬁgure will not represent an equilibrium. Again, the horizontal axis represents
location space while the vertical axis gives the price density for land in dollars
per foot. The horizontal axis is located at height αI/(l−1) rather than at zero
on the vertical axis. The price density is the same as in the previous section
for the consumer to the right of the ﬁrm. We replicate the same density for
the consumer to the left of the ﬁrm. This necessitates an alteration of the
density on the ﬁrm’s parcel, due to the presence of land to the left of the ﬁrm
that it would want to buy unless the price were raised (this is justiﬁed by the
12ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrm optimization with respect to b).T h u s , w e t a k e
the maximum of these two price densities. However, land at the extreme left
and extreme right in X is cheapest under this new density, so the ﬁrm would
m o v eo u tt oa ne x t r e m e . T op r e v e n tt h i s ,w em u s tr a i s et h ep r i c eo fl a n di n
the extremes by replicating a shifted price density once again, and taking the
maximum of all price densities. This will violate the ﬁrst order conditions
for the consumers, which state that the price of the edge of a parcel closer
to the ﬁrm must be t higher than the edge further away from the ﬁrm (as in
Berliant and Fujita [9]). This statement does not apply to the innermost two
consumers, since there is a discontinuity in their marginal commuting cost at
zero distance; there is no such discontinuity for consumers not adjacent to the
ﬁrm, so this statement must apply to them. Moreover, given that the price
density on each consumer parcel is the same, the total cost of each consumer
parcel is the same, so why would any consumer choose to live on a parcel not
adjacent to the ﬁrm? They would pay the same total land rent, but incur
a higher commuting cost further out, thus attaining a lower level of utility.
Figure 3 does not represent an equilibrium.
So how can we solve this problem and obtain an equilibrium? The answer
to this question lies in noticing that the problem we have is overconstrained.
We are asking too much of the rent density, in that it reﬂects diﬀerences in
commuting cost among parcels as stated above (essentially the Mills [30] –
Muth [31] condition for our model)12 , but at the same time, reﬂects the fact
that the proﬁt function only accounts for the cost and not the location of the
parcel, so the producer will always choose the cost minimizing one. In other
words, consumer optimization requires that rent decreases as distance from a
producer increases, to compensate for commuting costs, while the producer will
always ﬁnd the lowest cost parcel, located as far as possible from its current
spot.
If prices are low on the producer parcel, then consumers will move there to
reduce commuting cost. If prices are low on consumer parcels distant from the
producers to compensate for commuting cost, then producers will move there
to reduce land cost. Equilibrium is not likely to exist. This is in essence the
problem discovered by Koopmans and Beckmann [25] in their investigation of
the quadratic assignment problem.13 Although their model is diﬀerent from
12See, for instance, Fujita [20, p. 25, equation 2.37] for a nice statement and explanation.
13The quadratic assignment problem is distinct from, but related to, the linear assignment
problem (or one sided matching problem) that is generally more familiar to economists. The
quadratic assignment model allows ﬂows of (intermediate) goods between agents, at some
13ours, this kind of problem pertaining to existence of equilibrium arises in most
location models where all agents and resources are mobile.
We must specify out-of-equilibrium commuting costs properly. In the pure
exchange version of the Alonso model, the location to which consumers com-
mute, the central business district or CBD, is given and occupies no land.
Commuting cost is given by the “front location” or “front door” (closest point)
distance from the consumer’s parcel to the CBD. See Asami, Fujita and Smith
[6] for elaboration. However, if a producer (or the CBD) occupies space, it is
unclear, especially out of equilibrium, where the consumer must commute to.
For instance, if the consumer decides to buy a subset of the parcel used by a
producer, clearly a disequilibrium situation, what is its commuting distance
and cost? This must be speciﬁed, even out of equilibrium, in order to verify
whether a particular situation represents an equilibrium or not.
We assume that if a consumer outbids a producer, he or she can no longer
work at that location, since the producer will no longer be there. Consumers
and producers remain price takers; this is simply a speciﬁcation of disequilib-
rium commuting costs. Formally, it amounts to deﬁning commuting distance
f o rc o n s u m e rt oﬁrm j as
T
j
i (ai,s i,b j,σj)=
½
infx∈(ai,ai+si), y∈(bj,bj+σj) tkx−yk if (ai,ai+si)∩(bj,bj+σj)=∅
∞ if (ai,ai+si)∩(bj,bj+σj)6=∅.
Commuting cost is deﬁned to be minj T
j
i (A,B), analogous to the Alonso
model. We say that commuting cost satisﬁes the functional form restriction
when this commuting cost function is used.14 Notice that this commuting
cost function is not upper semicontinuous in consumer location; it can drop
discontinuously as the intersection of consumer and producer parcels tends to
the empty set.
Figure 4 illustrates what an equilibrium will look like. The horizontal axis
represents the location space X =[ −2l,2l], while the vertical axis is used for
the land price density (in dollars per foot). The horizontal axis is located not
at height zero, but at height p(2l), the equilibrium marginal utility of land for
the consumers located farthest from a ﬁrm. Equilibrium conﬁgurations consist
of individual producers surrounded by commuting consumers. This conﬁgura-
cost.
14We intend to attack the Koopmans-Beckmann quadratic assignment problem head on,
using the same modiﬁcation of out-of-equilibrium transport costs that we have used here
for commuting costs. If an agent wants to cohabit a parcel with another, then it must
go elsewhere for supplies (or more generally, transactions). In closing, we note that the
quadratic programming disease is present in many location models.
14tion involves agglomeration around a producer, essentially a company town.
Notice that parcels get cheaper as we move out away from a ﬁrm. This is
necessary in equilibrium in order to compensate for the increased cost of com-
muting as distance from the ﬁrm increases, for otherwise nobody would live in
the hinterlands. Notice also that we can do this while still making the ﬁrm’s
parcel the cheapest per unit cost of land, so the ﬁrm has no incentive to move.
The modiﬁcation of the commuting cost function implies that no consumer will
encroach on a producer’s parcel, since encroachment means that the consumer
must commute to the next closest producer, requiring a large jump in expendi-
ture on commuting. Thus, the commuting cost deters consumer encroachment
into a ﬁrm’s parcel, and the low price of land on a ﬁrm’s parcel keeps the ﬁrm
there.
There will be some restrictions on the parameters. The equilibrium will
have the same pattern as equilibrium in the Alonso model, that consumers with
h i g h e rw a g e sl i v ef u r t h e rf r o mt h eﬁrm and buy more land. As in Berliant and
Fujita [9], we try to ﬁnd equilibrium allocations that are Pareto optimal and use
the property that richer consumers purchase more land and are located farther
from the producer (otherwise we can switch positions of the consumers, save
on commuting costs, and create a Pareto improvement).15 For simplicity, we
shall only examine the case when all consumers are identical.
To make notation simpler, let X =[ −2l,2l].W ef o c u so nt h ep a r to ft h e
economy to the right of 0 in X; the part to the left will be symmetric. We
return to using the production function g(σ,q)=β · min(σ,q) − f.T h e r e
are 4I consumers. In contrast with the assumptions of the preceding section,
we allow a general utility function. The utility function of every consumer is
u(c,s),w h e r eu : R2
+ → R satisﬁes the following conditions, the ﬁrst three
of which are adapted from Berliant and Fujita [9, Assumption 1]. Let c =
C(s,u) deﬁne the indiﬀerence curve at utility level u and denote a partial
derivative by a subscript. As is standard, the implicit function theorem gives
us that −Cs(s,u)=( us/uc)(c,s). This is the marginal rate of substitution of
composite good for land, or the marginal willingness to pay for land.
Deﬁnition 8 A utility function u is said to be well-behaved if it satisﬁes the
following:
15If land is a normal good, consumers with higher wages and thus more income will
purchase more land. Although land is not strictly normal in the example we considered in
section 3, it is weakly normal in the sense that the income derivative of demand for land is
zero, so the argument applies.
15(i) On R2
++, u is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly quasi-concave,
and uc > 0, us > 0.
(ii) No indiﬀerence curve intersecting R2
++ cuts an axis, and every indif-
ference curve intersecting R2
++ has the c- a x i sa sa na s y m p t o t e .
(iii) Lot size (or land) s is a normal good on R2
++.
(iv) The composite consumption commodity is a normal good on R2
++.
(v) For each ﬁxed u, −Cs(s,u) is a convex function of s.
(vi) For each ﬁxed s>0, Css(s,u) is a nondecreasing function of u.
Cobb-Douglas utilities are an example.
Deﬁnition 9 The parameter restrictions for two producers are said to
be satisﬁed if the following hold. I ≥ 2, l ≥ 2I2 + I, 0 <f / β ≤ (16/17)I,
t/β ≥ 9/17. Finally, the marginal willingness to pay for land satisﬁes the
following inequality at a particular (given) allocation (c,s) > (0,0) (speciﬁed
in the appendix): (us/uc)(¯ c, ¯ s) > θ(I,l,β,f,t), where the function θ : R5 → R
is given in the appendix.
For example, a CES utility function will satisfy the last inequality if pa-
rameters are chosen appropriately.
These parameter restrictions imply that the total land available (l) is large
relative to the number of consumers and that marginal product (β) is large
relative to ﬁxed costs (or that the number of consumers is large relative to
ﬁxed costs) but small relative to commuting costs. The condition on marginal
willingness to pay for land at a particular bundle implies that one consumer’s
land consumption cannot become too small relative to another’s.
Theorem 3 If the utility function is well-behaved, commuting cost satisﬁes the
functional form restriction, and the parameter restrictions for two producers
hold, then there exists an equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix. Figure 4 provides a picture of the equilibrium, and
was explained earlier in this section.
T h es t r a t e g yo ft h ep r o o fi sa sf o l l o w s . G u e s st h a tt h eﬁrms’ parcels are
[−(l + I),−(l − I)] and [l − I,l+ I].T h e nw eﬁx a wage rate, and solve the
consumer equilibrium problem on the parcels not occupied by ﬁrms, exploiting
the results of Berliant and Fujita [9] to construct an equilibrium. We set the
ﬁr ml a n dp r i c el o w e rt h a nt h el o w e s tc o n s u m e rp r i c e ,t h ed i ﬀerence depending
only on ﬁxed costs, total land available, and the number of consumers. Then
16we set up the zero proﬁt condition of the ﬁrm in equilibrium, and ﬁnd a wage
rate that solves it. This wage rate, the implied rent density, the allocation of
land, and the allocation of consumption good form an equilibrium. The hard
part of the proof is to show that no consumer would intrude on a ﬁrm’s parcel,
and vice-versa.
The details of the proof can be found in the appendix.
5 The First Welfare Theorem
In this section we show that an equilibrium allocation can be ﬁrst best, though
it is not necessarily ﬁrst best. There are two reasons an equilibrium allocation
might not be ﬁrst best in this model. First, the entry or exit of a ﬁrm causes
an externality in that the ﬁrm does not account for the changes in commuting
cost to consumers as a consequence of its decision. Second, the location deci-
sion of a ﬁrm causes an externality in that the ﬁrm does not account for the
changes in commuting costs of consumers as a consequence of its decision. We
can characterize equilibrium allocations that are optimal in the second sense,
namely with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms.
For notational convenience, in this section we use X =[ −2l,2l] as the total-
ity of land available. The production function remains g(σ,q)=β·min(σ,q)−f
and the number of consumers remains I.
Deﬁnition 10 An allocation [(ci,a i,s i,Q i)I
i=1,c L,(zj,b j,σj,q j)J
j=1] is called
symmetric in production if
(i) the number of consumers commuting to a ﬁrm from the left and right
are equal and the same for all ﬁrms; that is, for all j, the cardinality of the
sets {i|1 ≤ i ≤ I, Q
j
i =1 , ai ≤ bj} and {i|1 ≤ i ≤ I, Q
j
i =1 , ai ≥ bj} is the
same and independent of j,a n d
(ii) the midpoints of the ﬁrm land parcels are evenly dispersed; that is, if
the numbering of ﬁrms is such that the midpoints of their parcels are ordered
from left to right, then bj + σj/2=−2l +2 l/J +4 ( j − 1)l/J.
Notice that by the ﬁrst requirement, I/(2J) must be integer.
Due to the form of the production function, for all producers j, land usage
is σj = I/J at any equilibrium allocation that is symmetric in production. If
we wish to examine the eﬃciency properties of an equilibrium allocation in
which a ﬁrm is shut down, then we can simply reduce J.
17Theorem 4 S u p p o s et h a tt h eu t i l i t yf u n c t i o nu is well-behaved. Fix any equi-
librium that is symmetric in production, and set J to be the number of ﬁrms j
with zj > 0 (eliminating the ﬁrms that are shut down). Then the equilibrium
allocation is Pareto optimal with J active ﬁrms.
Proof: See Appendix.
The purpose of this result is to cover the situation studied in section 4. The
result can easily be extended to the situations discussed in section 3, where
X =[ 0 ,l), I =1and J =1 , or more generally to cases where I/(2J) is
not integer. However, the beneﬁt of additional generality from such results is
exceeded by the cost of additional complexity that is introduced.
Notice that no agent has as their objective the minimization over J of the











I,BJ) is an equilibrium parcel conﬁguration with J ac-
tive ﬁrms. The landlord comes closest to having this as an objective (through
maximization of land rent); an equilibrium concept in which the landlord im-
plicitly chooses the number of active ﬁrms by choosing the rent density could
be formulated, but the objective is still not quite the same as minimization of
ﬁxed costs plus aggregate commuting cost. Since J is not chosen by an agent
who accounts for the externality, one cannot in general expect equilibrium al-
locations to result in an optimal number of active ﬁrms. This explains the
notion of eﬃciency that is used here, which is conditional on J active ﬁrms. If
J happens to minimize ﬁxed cost plus aggregate commuting cost, then Theo-
rem 4 implies that an equilibrium allocation that is symmetric in production
is ﬁrst best.
6 Conclusions and Extensions
Using some classes of examples, we have examined how land can reconcile
increasing returns and perfect competition in the following sense. In a model
without location, production of a commodity using a technology requiring a
ﬁxed cost followed by constant returns to scale will imply that only one ﬁrm
producing this goodwill operate in an eﬃcient allocation. However, in a spatial
model with commuting cost, such as the one examined here, there is a trade-
oﬀ between returns to scale and the cost of accessing a ﬁrm, thus limiting the
extent of the market served by any single ﬁrm, and therefore allowing multiple
active ﬁr m si na ne ﬃcient allocation. A perfectly competitive equilibrium can
18result in a land price scheme that limits ﬁrm size optimally and provides a
subsidy to active ﬁrms consistent with eﬃciency.
The numbers of ﬁrms and consumers can be made large by replicating the
example of section 4.
The questions we have studied seem important not only in the theory of
industrial organization, in that government intervention in markets for goods
produced under an increasing returns to scale technology may not be justiﬁed,
but also in the theory of spatial economics. For example, we can separate
results due to imperfect competition from those due to the presence of loca-
tion in models. These questions are of central interest to urban economics and
location theory as well. The Spatial Impossibility Theorem of Starrett [44],
as interpreted by Fujita [18], tells us that some assumption of neoclassical
economics must not hold if we are to generate equilibrium models of agglom-
eration. Here we have used increasing returns and perfect competition, but we
are able to generate agglomeration and factory towns in equilibrium without
imperfect competition. Unlike much of the other work on agglomeration, our
equilibrium conﬁgurations can be ﬁrst best.16
Here we have assumed perfect competition, but have not justiﬁed this as-
sumption formally. The latter should be the subject of future work; the tests
of Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame [24] for perfect competition should be useful.
One testable implication derived from the model is that the unit land price
of a ﬁrm’s parcel should be low relative to the unit price of residential land
surrounding the producer. Of course, the hazards involved in testing this
hypothesis include the diﬃculty in separating the value of land from structures
as well as zoning laws.
Another issue of interest is the conjecture that, in both this model and the
simpler Alonso exchange model, even though equilibria exist and equilibrium
allocations are Pareto optimal (see Berliant and Fujita [9] for the exchange
case), the core can be empty. Thus far, we have a quasi-linear example (see
section 3) where the emptiness or non-emptiness of the core depends on endow-
16A referee has suggested that, as a further extension, the assumption that consumers have
no intrinsic preference for location be relaxed as follows. Consumers have single peaked
preferences over location with bliss points uniformly distributed over front locations in X.
In general, heterogeneity in consumer utilities or endowments such as locational preference
allows more room for existence of equilibrium, since equal utility conditions no longer need
to hold in equilibrium. However, heterogeneity also makes the calculations in the analysis
much messier. Probably extensions such as this one will have to wait for diﬀerent techniques
of proof.
19ments. We intend to look at this more generally, and examine the implications
for core convergence.
7A p p e n d i x
Parameter Restrictions for Continuous Equilibrium Price Densities:
φc(α,l) ≤ α/[l−2]−α·ln[(l−1)/(l−2)], Bc(α,l)=α/(l−2)+2α·ln[(l−
1)/((l/2)−1)]−α·ln[(l −1)/(l −2)], τc(α,l)=2 α[1/(l −2)−1/l]. It is easy
to see that the functions φc and Bc are positive.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 :Let p(x)=α/(l − x − 1) for x ≤ l/2, p(x)=
α/(x − 1) for x ≥ l/2, b =0 , σ =1 , q =1 , z = β − f, a =1 , s = l − 1,
Q =[ 1 ] , w = β − α/(l − 2), π = β − f − w − α · ln[(l − 1)/(l − 2)], c =
w −{2α·ln[(l −1)/((l/2)−1)]−α·ln[(l −1)/(l −2)]} (which is non-negative
by the assumption on β),a n dcL =2 α · ln((l − 1)/({l/2} − 1)) + π.W ec l a i m
that this is an equilibrium. Figure 1 provides a sketch of the price density.
First, we verify that this is indeed a feasible allocation. To verify (3), note
that commuting cost is zero in this allocation, and calculate
c+cL = w−{2α·ln[(l−1)/((l/2)−1)]−α·ln[(l−1)/(l−2)]}+2α·ln[(l−
1)/((l/2) − 1)] + β − f − w − α · ln[(l − 1)/(l − 2)] = β − f = z.
(4) and (5) are obvious. Finally, note that [0,1),[1,l) is indeed a partition
of X,s o( 6 )h o l d s .
Regarding the equilibrium conditions (7), (8), and (9), (7) can be veri-
ﬁed simply by calculating the total area under the price density, 2α · ln[(l −
1)/((l/2) − 1)], and adding to it proﬁts π.
Problem (1) can be written as the following unconstrained optimization
problem by substituting the budget constraint for c:
max
a,s α · ln(s)+w −
Z a+s
a
p(x)dm(x) − t · max(0,a− 1)
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to s is p(a+s)=α/s;t h i si sv e r i ﬁed
for our price density at a =1and s = l − 1.T h e ﬁrst order condition with
respect to a is p(a) − p(a + s)=t if a>1, p(a) − p(a + s) ∈ [0,t] if a =1 ,
p(a)−p(a+s)=0if a<1. This is an interesting and important fact. Notice
ﬁr s tt h a ti fa =1 , the parameter restriction on t implies p(a) − p(a + s)=
α/(l−2)−α/(l−1) < 2α[1/(l−2)−1/l] ≤ t, so our equilibrium satisﬁes the ﬁrst
order condition. Second, this ﬁrst order condition is a result of the assumption
that closest point distance is all that matters when computing commuting
20cost, so discontinuous marginal commuting cost is the consequence. Total
commuting cost is continuous.
Regarding second order conditions for the consumer, it is rather evident
that the consumer cannot do better by decreasing its parcel size to the right
of l/2, since the rent curve is equal to the marginal willingness to pay for land
o ft h ec o n s u m e rw i t hl e f te n d p o i n ta t1 ;i ft h el e f te n d p o i n ti sg r e a t e rt h a n
1, then marginal willingness to pay exceeds price. For points x ∈ (1,l/2],
we must prove that marginal utility of land exceeds price less the reduction
in commuting cost from purchasing additional land closer to the producer.
Marginal utility is α/(l − x),w h i l ep r i c ei sα/(l − 1 − x) and commuting
cost is t.T h u s , f o r x ∈ (1,l/2], we must show that α/(l − x) ≥ α/(l −
1 − x) − t. The parameter restriction on t is t ≥ 2 · α(1/(l − 2) − 1/l),s o
t ≥ α[1/((l/2) − 1) − 1/(l/2)] and α/(l − x) ≥ α/(l − 1 − x) − t at x = l/2.
Since ∂
∂x[α/(l − x) − α/(l − 1 − x)+t]=α[1/(l − x)2 − 1/(l − 1 − x)2] < 0,
α/(l − x) ≥ α/(l − 1 − x) − t for all x ∈ (1,l/2]. The consumer cannot do
better by increasing its parcel size (starting from [1,l)) since for larger parcels,
the rent curve α/(l − x − 1) is greater than the marginal willingness to pay
for land α/(l − x). Due to the symmetry of the rent curve, the consumer
cannot do better by owning a parcel containing {0} rather than {l}.T h u s ,t h e
equilibrium allocation solves (1) for the consumer.
With regard to the ﬁrm, notice that optimization will imply that q = σ
and optimization problem (2) reduces to:
max
b,σ β · σ − f −
Z b+σ
b
p(x)dm(x) − w · σ
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to σ is β−p(b+σ)−w =0 ,a n dw was
chosen to satisfy this equality for b =0and σ =1 .T h eﬁrst order condition
with respect to b is p(b)=p(b + σ),17 which can either be ignored since the
producer hits the land boundary at zero, or we can set p(0) = α/(l−2), altering
p on a set of measure zero.
Turning next to second order conditions for the ﬁrm, notice ﬁrst that if
the ﬁrm uses a parcel of any size, it is indiﬀerent about its location, so it will
choose one of the cheapest parcels, and [0,σ) is among these. The ﬁrst order
condition with respect to σ will imply that it will choose σ =1 . Beyond this,
up to σ = l/2, the marginal cost of land exceeds the marginal beneﬁtn e t
of labor cost. If the ﬁrm can make higher proﬁts from expanding the scale
o fi t so p e r a t i o n sb e y o n d1 ,t h e ng i v e nt h ep r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o na n dt h ep r i c e
17This reﬂects the location independence of the production function.
21density, it will make higher proﬁts when b =0and σ = l.P r o ﬁts from such a
production plan are given by
β · l − f − w · l − 2 · α ·
Z l
l/2
1/(x − 1)dm(x) (10)
Proﬁts from the equilibrium production plan are given by
β − f − w − α ·
Z l
l−1
1/(x − 1)dm(x) (11)
Following some calculations, it can be shown that (11) always exceeds (10)
if [(l−1)/(l−2)] ≤ 2·ln(2)+ln[(l−1)/(l−2)] or, as assumed above, l ≥ 2.87.
Finally, it is necessary to show that (11) is non-negative, in order to en-
sure that the producer will not exit. Again, following some calculations, the
assumption that f ≤ α/[l−2]−α·ln[(l−1)/(l−2)] implies that (11) is always
non-negative.
Q.E.D.
Parameter Restrictions for Discontinuous Equilibrium Price Den-
sities: φd(α,l)=α·[1/(l −2)−1/(l −1)], Bd(α,l)=α/(l −2)+α/(l −1)+
2α · ln[(l − 2)/(l/2 − 1))], τd(α,l)=2· α[1/(l − 2) − 1/l].
Proof of Theorem 2: Let p(x)=α/(l − x − 1) for 1 ≤ x ≤ l/2, p(x)=
α/(x−1) for l−1 ≥ x ≥ l/2, p(x)=α/(l−1) for 0 ≤ x<1, p(x)=α/(l−1)
for l − 1 <x≤ l, b =0 , σ =1 , q =1 , z = β − f, a =1 , s = l − 1,
Q =[ 1 ] , w = β − α/(l − 2), π = β − f − w − α/(l − 1), c = w − {α/(l −
1)+2α·ln[(l−2)/(l/2−1)]} (which is non-negative by the assumption on β),
and cL =2 α/(l − 1) + 2α · ln[(l − 2)/(l/2 − 1)] + π. We claim that this is an
equilibrium. Figure 2 provides a sketch of the price density.
First, we verify that this is indeed a feasible allocation. To verify (3), note
that commuting cost is zero in this allocation, and calculate
c+cL = w−{α/(l−1)+2α·ln[(l−2)/(l/2−1)]}+2α/(l−1)+2α·ln[(l−
2)/(l/2 − 1)] + β − f − w − α/(l − 1) = β − f = z.
Veriﬁcations of equations (4) and (5) are obvious. Finally, note that
[0,1),[1,l) is indeed a partition of X,s o( 6 )h o l d s .
Regarding the equilibrium conditions (7), (8), and (9), (7) can be veriﬁed
simply by calculating the total area under the price density, 2α/(l − 1) + 2α ·
ln[(l − 2)/(l/2 − 1)], and adding to it proﬁts π.
As the reader might suspect, the remainder of the proof that the speciﬁed
discontinuous rent density and allocation is in fact an equilibrium is quite
22analogous to the proof for continuous equilibrium rent densities, so we shall
n o tb o t h e rt or e p e a ti th e r e .T h ep r o o ft h a te q u i l i b r i u mp r o ﬁts are larger than
proﬁts using all land involves solving a quadratic equation, the largest root of
which is approximately 3.19.
Q.E.D.
Parameter Restrictions for Two Producers:
Let (c0,s 0) solve maxc,s u(c,s) subject to c + p0s ≤ w0 for w0 =( β +
f
4(l−I))/(1 + I
l−I) and p0 = β +
f




Then specify ¯ c =m i n {β − f/(2I) − f[l/(2I) − 1/4]/I − (1 − 1/I2)(l − I)t,
f[l/(2I) − 1/4](l − I − I¯ s)/[(l − I)(I − 1)]} and ¯ s =m a x {f(2l/I − 1)/[(l −
I)(I −1)t], l−I
I − I−1
2 t/Css(s0,u ∗)}. θ(I,l,β,f,t)=β +f/[4(l−I)]+(I −1)t.
The expressions are positive. ¯ s>0 due to the assumption on l. θ > 0 by
the assumption on f/β. c>0 because ¯ s<(l − I)/I. To see this, consider
the ﬁrst expression in the deﬁnition of ¯ s. It is less than (l − I)/I due to the
assumptions on I, l and f/t ≤ (16/9)I. The second expression is obviously
less than (l − I)/I.
Proof of Theorem 3: We begin by ﬁxing w,t h ew a g er a t e ,i n[0,β +
f/[4(l − I)]]. Apply Proposition 4 of Berliant and Fujita [9] to the exchange
economy where consumers i =1 ,...,I have an endowment of consumption
good w and land is limited to the interval (l + I,2l], to obtain an equilibrium
price density pw(x),w h e r epw(2l) is uniquely determined (and is the same for
all equilibria). Using the assumption that land is a normal good, pw(2l) is in-
creasing in w. Using upper hemi-continuity of the equilibrium correspondence
of the exchange economy in w, pw(2l) is continuous in w.W ew a n tt os o l v e
β − w − f/(2I) − pw(2l)+f[l/(2I) − 1/4]/(l − I)=0 (12)
on 0 ≤ w ≤ β + f/[4(l − I)]. This will be the zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o nf o rt h e
ﬁrms (with pw(2l) − f[l/(2I) − 1/4]/(l − I) representing rent).
As w tends to zero, pw(2l) tends to zero, so the left hand side of (12)
tends to β + f/[4(l − I)], which is positive by assumption on l.N o t et h a ta t
w = β+f/[4(l−I)], the left hand side is −pβ+f/[4(l−I)](2l), which is nonpositive.
By the intermediate value theorem, there is a w∗ solving the equation.
Deﬁne p = pw∗. Mirror the allocation on the interval (0,l− I).T h e
allocations on the intervals (−2l,−l−I) and (−l+I,0) are deﬁned analogously.
Let Q1
i =1and Q2
i =0if i ≤ 2I.L e tQ1
i =0and Q2
i =1if i>2I.
23For l − I ≤ x ≤ l + I,d e ﬁne p(x)=p(2l) − f[l/(2I) − 1/4]/(l − I).T h e
price density on the ﬁrm’s parcel is less than the lowest price on any consumer’s
parcel.
For 0 ≤ x ≤ l − I,d e ﬁne p(x)=p(2l − x).F o r −2l ≤ x ≤ 0,d e ﬁne
p(x)=p(−x).
Let b1 = l − I, b2 = −l − I.F o r j =1 ,2 let σj =2 I, qj =2 I, zj =
2Iβ − f, πj =0 . For consumers residing in the interval (l + I,2l), ci = w∗ −
R ai+si
ai p(x)dm(x)−t·(ai−l−I) ≥ 0 by construction of the exchange economy
allocations. The consumption of other consumers is deﬁned analogously. cL =
R 2l
−2l p(x)dm(x) ≥ 0.
We claim that this is an equilibrium. First we must prove that the price
density on the ﬁrm’s parcel is non-negative (this also ensures cL ≥ 0). This is
tantamount to a lower bound on p(2l), the minimal willingness to pay for land
in the exchange economy equilibrium on the interval (l + I,2l]. The vehicle
will be the assumption on the marginal rate of substitution, but its application
requires s1 ≤ ¯ s and c1 ≥ ¯ c, where the parcel front locations are a1 ≤ ai ≤ aI.
Using the assumption that land is a normal good, s1 ≤ ... ≤ si ≤ ... ≤ sI,
c1 ≥ ... ≥ ci ≥ ... ≥ cI; moreover, the rent density is constant on the ﬁrst
parcel and decreases by t across every other parcel; see Berliant and Fujita [9].
We will also use two upper bounds. When all si =( l −I)/I, an upper bound
for rent on (l + I,2l] is obtained, namely
p(2l)(l − I)+( I − 1)t(l − I)/I +( I − 1)t(l − I)/I + ... + t(l − I)/I
= p(2l)(l − I)+( I − 1)(1 + I/2)t(l − I)/I,
and transport cost on (l + I,2l] is maximal, namely
t(l − I)/I + ... +t(I − 1)(l − I)/I = t(I − 1)I(l − I)/(2I).
Now suppose, to the contrary, that the price density on the ﬁrm’s parcel
is negative, then p(2l) <f [l/(2I) − 1/4]/(l − I) and by equation (12) w∗ >
β −f/(2I). Subtracting the upper bounds for rent and transport cost, a lower
bound for mean consumption is β−f/(2I)−p(2l)(l−I)/I −(I −1)(1+I)(l−
I)t/I2 >
β − f/(2I) − f[l/(2I) − 1/4]/I − (1 − 1/I2)(l − I)t ≥ ¯ c by deﬁnition of ¯ c.
It follows that c1 ≥ ¯ c.N e x tw ep r o v es1 ≤ ¯ s.
For this purpose we ﬁrst establish a lower bound for s1. N o t i c et h a tf r o m
equation (12), β +
f
4(l−I) = β − f/(2I)+f[l/(2I) − 1/4]/(l − I)=w + p(2l).




4(l−I) ≤ w(1 + I
l−I). Hence w ≥ w0. Also from equation
24(12), p(2l) ≤ β +
f
4(l−I). Hence the price paid by consumer 1 for land is
p(2l)+( I − 1)t ≤ β +
f
4(l−I) +( I − 1)t = p0. Since land is a normal good,
w ≥ w0 and p(2l)+( I − 1)t ≤ p0 yield s1 ≥ s0.
Denote the equilibrium level of utility for all consumers by u.B y a s -
sumption −Cs(s,u) is convex, hence Cs(s,u) is concave and Css(s,u) is non-
increasing in s, so that the mean value theorem implies Cs(s2,u)−Cs(s1,u) ≤
Css(s0,u)(s2 − s1). B u tt h el e f th a n ds i d eo ft h i si n e q u a l i t yi st,t h ed r o pi n
rent across the parcel of consumer 2. It follows that s2 − s1 ≥ t/Css(s0,u) ≥
t/Css(s0,u ∗) where u∗ = u(β +
f
4(l−I), l−I
I ) ≥ u(c1,s 1), using the assumption
that Css is nondecreasing in u. In fact, this argument applies to every pair
of adjacent consumers (there is nothing special about consumers 1 and 2).
Thus, s1 ≤ si −(i−1)t/Css(s0,u ∗),s oIs1 ≤ l −I − I




Consumer 1 pays rent density p(2l)+ (I − 1)t. This price equals the con-
sumer’s marginal willingness to pay for land which exceeds θ(I,l,β,f,t)=
β −f/[4(l−I)]+(I −1)t by assumption on the marginal rate of substitution,
normality of both goods. Subtracting (I − 1)t, p(2l) ≥ β − f/[4(l − I)] ≥
f(17/16)/I − f/[4(l − I)] ≥ f(I +1 ) /(2I2) − f/[4(l − I)] ≥ fl/[2I(l − I)] −
f/[4(l −I)] by assumption on f/β,Iand l, respectively. This contradicts the
presumption and thus completes the proof of the nonnegativity of p(x).
(3) is veriﬁed by substitution of the expressions above for consumption and
output (note that the transportation cost terms cancel). Equations (4), (5),
(6) and (7) hold by construction.
Next, we argue that the allocation we have speciﬁed solves the consumers’
problems (1). By construction of the exchange economy equilibrium, no con-
sumer has an incentive to relocate within the intervals occupied by the con-
sumers. The land occupied by producers is less expensive than any land oc-
cupied by consumers, but always requires more transport cost. Consider a
consumer parcel (a,a + s) containing part of the land parcel of the ﬁrm lo-
cated at (l −I,l+ I). We may assume that a + s/2 ≤ l.F o ri fa + s/2 >l ,
then we can ﬂip the consumer parcel symmetrically about l,s a v eo nc o m m u t i n g
cost, and obtain the same quantity of land.
First we consider the case a + s>l+ I. The idea is to shift the parcel
towards the left. This saves commuting cost. It also saves rent, as long as
p(a) ≤ p(a+s).B ys y m m e t r ya b o u tl, rent density p(a+s) is also attained at
2l−(a+s),b u ta i st ot h el e f to ft h i sp o i n t ,s i n c ea+s/2 ≤ l.T h en e x tp o i n t
leftward where rent density p(a + s) is attained is−2l +( a + s), by symmetry
25about 0. As long as s ≤ 2l, a is to the right of −2l +( a + s) and we can shift
the parcel towards the left, saving both commuting cost and rent. If s>2l,
then since a + s/2 ≤ l, a<0; now we will show that the utility associated
with such a big parcel is below the equilibrium utility level of consumers.
We distinguish two sub-cases. Call the rightmost consumer commuting to
t h el e f tp r o d u c e rc o n s u m e ri.I n t h eﬁrst sub-case, a ≤ ai. The encroaching
consumer is spending at least as much on land as any consumer in equilibrium,
is consuming at least as much land, and is facing the same marginal commuting
cost. Therefore, using strict quasi-concavity, the marginal willingness to pay
of this encroaching consumer for land to the left of ai is no more than the
marginal willingness to pay of consumer i. So parcels containing points to the
left of ai will yield lower utility. Now consider the second sub-case, ai <a<0.
By shifting the parcel to the left, towards the left producer, the quantity of land
consumed is the same, and the savings in commuting cost (t per unit distance)
exceed the additional rent, p(a)−p(a+s). This inequality follows from three
f a c t s . F i r s t ,s i n c ew ea r ei nt h ed e c l i n i n gr e n tr e g i o n ,p(a) <p (ai).S e c o n d ,
p(a+s) ≥ p(0), the minimum consumer rent density (recall that a+s>l+I,
so a + s is in a consumer’s parcel). Third, p(ai) − p(0) = t,t h eﬁrst order
condition of consumer i with respect to a. Thus, a shift to the left increases
utility and we conclude that it suﬃces to consider a + s ≤ l + I.
Summarizing, ruling out a ≤ ai as before, and using the fact that very small
consumer parcels will only be located on the left part of the ﬁrm’s parcel, (l
−I,l+I), to save commuting cost, the only choices that might be optimizing
and yielding higher utility than equilibrium utility for any consumer are:
for s<2I (the size of the ﬁrm’s parcel), (l −I, l− I + s)
for 2I ≤ s ≤ l + I + si (or ai ≤ a ≤ l − I), (a,l + I).
In the ﬁrst case, by assumption, l ≥ 2I2 + I, s<2I ≤ (l − I)/I ≤ si.I f
the encroaching consumer has a greater utility level than consumer i,t h e nw e
reduce his composite good consumption until the utility levels are the same.
By strict quasi-concavity, the marginal willingness to pay for land is greater
for the encroaching consumer. By the ﬁrst order conditions the rent density
he faces on the right hand side of his parcel must exceed that of consumer i.
This contradicts the construction of the rent schedule.
In the second case the parcel is (a,l + I).I f a>0, let us compare this
parcel to an alternative parcel, (a − 2I,l− I), that is the same size but just
does not encroach on the producer. Since a>0 and the alternative parcel
does not encroach, the consumer saves at least (l − I)t in commuting cost by
26moving to the alternative, which is adjacent to a producer. An upper bound on
the additional cost of land is the diﬀerence between the maximal and minimal
prices of land over a parcel of size 2I, 2I(I − 1)t + f(l − I/2)/(l − I).T h i si s
less than (l−I)t, by the assumptions on f and t (yielding f/t≤ (16/9)I)a n d
on l (the lower bound is a worst case) and I. Summarizing, the alternative
parcel (that does not encroach on a producer), (a − 2I, l−I), is the same size
as the original parcel, (a,l +I), and after paying for commuting cost, there is
at least as much consumption good remaining. Thus, the only parcel choices
that might be optimizing and yielding higher utility than equilibrium utility
are (a,l + I) where ai ≤ a ≤ 0.
If ai ≤ a ≤ 0, then the amount of land purchased exceeds l−I, hence si,a n d
therefore the marginal willingness to pay for land is less than p(2l). Hence the












[p(x) − p(2l)]dm(x) ≤ 2If[l/(2I) − 1/4]/(l − I).( 1 3 )
Next, we contradict this inequality by using our assumptions. In the proof
of the non-negativity of the ﬁrms’s rent the combination c1 ≥ ¯ c and s1 ≤ ¯ s
was shown to contradict the assumption on the marginal rate of substitution.
Two possibilities remain: s1 > ¯ s or c1 < ¯ c.I fs1 > ¯ s,t h e ns1 > 4f[l/(2I) −
1/4]/[(l+I)(I−1)t],s os1(I−1)t>4f[l/(2I)−1/4]/(l+I).N o ws2(I−2)t ≥
s1(I − 2)t,...,sI−1t ≥ s1t. Summing these inequalities and using 1+2+... +
I − 1=( I − 1)I/2,w eo b t a i n
R l−I
0 (p(x) − p(2l))dm(x) > ¯ s(I − 1)It/2=
2If[l/(2I) − 1/4]/(l + I), contradicting inequality (13).
Now consider the remaining case, c1 < ¯ c and s1 < ¯ s. Use the lower bounds
for transport cost and rent on [0,l− I): ts1 + ... + t(I − 1)s1 = t(I − 1)Is1/2
and p(2l)(l−I)+(I−1)ts1+...+ts1 = p(2l)(l−I)+(I−1)Its1/2, respectively.
Then using c1 (the consumption of the ﬁrst consumer) as a lower bound on the
consumption on the interval [0,l−I), c1 +p(2l)(l −I)+(I −1)Its1 ≤ Iw∗ =
Ic1 +I[p(2l)+(I −1)t]s1. Hence, using the non-negativity of the ﬁrms’s rent,
c1 ≥ [p(2l)(l−I)−Ip(2l)s1]/(I−1) ≥ f[l/(2I)−1/4](l−I−I¯ s)/[(l+I)(I−1)] ≥
¯ c by deﬁnition of ¯ c, contradicting c1 < ¯ c.
Thus when transport costs are taken into account, the willingness to pay
of a consumer for any land occupied by a producer falls short of the cost. A
consumer purchasing land used by a producer will have utility lower than a
consumer farthest away from a producer. Since all consumers are at the same
utility level in equilibrium, such a purchase would reduce the utility level of
27the consumer, and therefore will not be made.
With regard to the ﬁrms, notice that optimization will imply that the labor
input quantity will be set equal to the land input quantity, and optimization
problem (2) reduces to:
max





The ﬁrst order condition with respect to σ is β−w∗ = p(b+σ) ∈ [p(l),p(l+
I)]. Marginal revenue net of labor cost equals the marginal cost of land. Since
there is a discontinuity in the price of land, this net marginal revenue need
only be between the bounds of the discontinuity. w∗ was chosen to satisfy this
condition for b1 = l − I, σ1 =2 I, b2 = −l − I, σ2 =2 I.T h e ﬁrst order
condition with respect to b is p(b)=p(b + σ);t h i si sf u l ﬁlled by symmetry.
Equilibrium proﬁts are zero by construction of w∗; see equation (12).
Turning next to second order conditions for the ﬁrm, notice ﬁrst that if
the ﬁrm uses a parcel of any size σ, it is indiﬀerent about its location, so it
will choose one of the cheapest parcels. For σ ≤ 2I, these are contained in
(b1,b 1+σ1), (b2,b 2+σ2).T h eﬁrst order condition with respect to σ will imply
that it will choose σ =2 I. If it occupies a parcel at an extreme of X and σ is
slightly larger than 2I, then the cost of this parcel is higher than the cost of a
similarly slight extension of (b1,b 1 + σ1) or (b2,b 2 + σ2).I ft h eﬁrm can make
higher proﬁts from expanding the scale of its operations beyond 2I, then given
the production function and the price density, it will make still higher proﬁts
when b = −2l and σ =4 l.
Proﬁts from such a production plan are given by
4βl − f − w




Proﬁts from the equilibrium production plan are zero by construction of
w∗. Using this by substituting the deﬁnition of w∗ given by equation (12)
into equation (14), after some tedious calculations, non-positivity of (14) is
equivalent to
R l−I
0 [p(x) − p(2l)]dm(x) ≥ 0. The integrand is non-negative by
construction.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4: Take an equilibrium allocation
[(ci,a i,s i,Q i)
I
i=1,c L,(zj,b j,σj,q j)
J
j=1]


























j > 0∀j.S o u(c0
i,s 0
i) ≥ u(ci,s i) for all i and c0
L ≥ cL, with strict
inequality holding for at least one relation.
First,18 we assert that without loss of generality, we can assume that the
land parcels of consumers commuting to a ﬁrm in the Pareto dominating allo-
cation form a connected set in combination with that ﬁrm’s parcel. For if not,
we can switch the land parcels around so that they do form a connected set,
and create a Pareto improvement by reducing aggregate commuting cost and
distributing the surplus composite commodity to the landlord.
Second, we argue that without loss of generality, the Pareto dominating
allocation has the same number of consumers commuting to each ﬁrm from
each side or direction. By the ﬁrst condition deﬁning an allocation that is sym-
metric in production, I/(2J) is integer. All consumers commute (see footnote
6). It follows that the diﬀerence between the maximum and minimum number
of consumers commuting to any ﬁr mf r o mo n es i d ea tt h eP a r e t od o m i n a t i n g
allocation, ¯ n and n respectively, must be more than one. [The proof is by con-
tradiction. There are 2J clusters of consumers (to the left and to the right of
the J ﬁrms). Let the number of clusters with n consumers be N, 0 <N<2J.
Now suppose ¯ n = n +1 .T h e nI = nN +( n + 1)(2J − N)=( n +1 ) 2 J − N.
Dividing by 2J we obtain that N/(2J) is integer, contradicting 0 <N<2J.]
Take the closest consumer, consumer 1, commuting to a ﬁrm from a side with
¯ n consumers commuting to the ﬁrm. Move this consumer, retaining their land
and composite good consumption, to the side of a ﬁrm with n consumers com-
muting to it. Place this consumer so that it is the agent adjacent to the ﬁrm
on the side with n consumers commuting to it. Shift agents (without changing
their order) so that material balance is maintained in the land market.
We claim that this rearrangement of consumers creates a Pareto improve-
ment. The reason is as follows. Removing the ﬁrst consumer from the side
with ¯ n consumers reduces total commuting cost from that side by (¯ n−1)·s0
1·t.
Placing the consumer in the side with n commuters increases commuting cost
by n · s0
1 · t,w h e r en < ¯ n − 1. Thus, a surplus of composite good is created,
and this can be given to the landlord.
18At this juncture, it is important to note that the concept of “Pareto optimality with J
active ﬁrms” implies that no ﬁrm is shut down in the Pareto dominating allocation.
29Since I/(2J) is integer, it must be that each ﬁrm has the same number of
consumers commuting to it from each side. From the form of the production
function, we know that the production plans of all ﬁrms must therefore be
identical, since labor usage is identical (and equal to I/J).
Third, we claim that without loss of generality, the Pareto improving allo-
cation has the property that the consumers adjacent to a ﬁrm all have the same
allocations of consumption good and land, the consumers second closest to a
ﬁrm all have the same allocations, and so forth. For suppose that this were not
the case. Take the set of all of the consumers who are i people from the ﬁrm to
which they are commuting. Take the average of their allocations and give each
of them the average allocation. Do this separately for each set of consumers
who are i people from each ﬁrm. This new, average allocation is feasible since
the original allocation is feasible. For instance, aggregate commuting cost is
the same in both the original and averaged allocations. Moreover, since utility
is strictly quasi-concave, the original allocation Pareto dominates the equilib-
rium allocation, and the equilibrium allocation features equal utility levels for
all consumers (see footnote 6), the average allocation also Pareto dominates
the equilibrium allocation.
An immediate implication is that the Pareto dominating allocation is, with-
out loss of generality, symmetric in production. Since the equilibrium alloca-
tion is symmetric in production (by assumption), the locations of producers
and their land usage are the same in both the equilibrium allocation and the
Pareto dominating allocation.19 Thus, the diﬀerence boils down to a pure
exchange economy where the central business districts are the ﬁrms and the
consumers are each endowed with w units of consumption good. From Berliant
and Fujita [9, Proposition 2], given a ﬁxed production sector, the equilibrium
allocation is eﬃcient. This contradicts the presumed existence of a Pareto
dominating allocation. So the hypothesis is false, and the equilibrium alloca-
tion is Pareto optimal.
Q.E.D.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium with Multiple Consumers and Two Firms
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